A Triumph of Myth over Principle: The Saga of the Montana Open-Range by Andes, Roy H.
Montana Law Review
Volume 56
Issue 2 Summer 1995 Article 5
7-1-1995
A Triumph of Myth over Principle: The Saga of the
Montana Open-Range
Roy H. Andes
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Roy H. Andes, A Triumph of Myth over Principle: The Saga of the Montana Open-Range, 56 Mont. L. Rev. (1995).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
A TRIUMPH OF MYTH OVER PRINCIPLE: THE
SAGA OF THE MONTANA OPEN-RANGE
Roy H. Andes*
"Oh give me lands,
Lots of lands under starry skies above,
Don't fence me in. . .
I. INTRODUCTION
Many city people-as well as full fledged Montana-
borns-find part of Montana's charm in its wide open spaces.
Cresting a hilltop by car, one may encounter a cowperson on
horseback, a Kenworth tractor-trailer, a bull elk, or a pair of
black angus heifers. By romantic tradition and to large extent by
law, all have equal run of Montana's range. The "open range"
tradition permits free-ranging livestock, limited only by fence-
building or herding by persons who wish to exclude wandering
animals. The word "free" is literal; the livestock-owner pays
nothing for grazing other people's unfenced grass.
Most people assume that "open range" is the law of Mon-
tana.2 The Supreme Court of the Montana Territory so held in
Smith v. Williams.3 Therein, the court concluded that damages
caused by trespassing livestock may not be recovered unless the
plaintiff had erected a statutory "legal" fence to fence out ani-
mals.4 But that tradition may not well-serve modern Montana
with high speed automobiles, growing population and increasing
urbanization. This Article first surveys national range law, then
compares the national trend to Montana's law. The Article con-
cludes by assessing to what extent open range rules should re-
main part of Montana law.
* Agency Counsel, Montana Department of State Lands; M.A. Communication
Studies, University of Montana, 1988; J.D. University of Virginia School of Law,
1977; B.A., History, Bridgewater College, 1973.
1. Lyrics by Robert Fletcher; melody by Cole Porter.
2. See Williams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); State ex rel.
Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987); Siegfried v. Atchison, 219
Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013
(1982).
3. 2 Mont. 195, 202 (1874).
4. Smith, 2 Mont. at 197-202 (interpreting the predecessor statute to MONT.
CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
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II. RANGE LAw NATIONALLY
A. In the Beginning-Mere Custom
An understanding of range law requires examination of its
social and legal history. One scholar described the law of the
range as the purest example of geographical circumstances deter-
mining legal rules.5
In contrast to the open range policy of the western United
States, the common law of the range derives from England and
requires the stock owner to restrain his livestock from running
at large. Failure to restrain animals imposes strict liability for
any damages caused by trespassing livestock. Such common law
range rules apply in most jurisdictions, particularly the eastern
states.6
However, by early custom in the West, the federal govern-
ment allowed private individuals to gratuitously graze stock at
large on federal lands. The practice was permitted because of the
presence of "great plains and vast tracts of unenclosed land,
suitable for pasture."7 At the time, "[it] was reasoned that much
of the land would be unused if farmers were required to limit
grazing to areas enclosed with fences."8 Nineteenth century eth-
ics abhorred such "waste," so the western territories and newly
admitted states generally continued the open range custom ei-
ther by statute or judicial decision.' In 1894, the United States
Supreme Court summarized as follows:
As there are, or were, in the State of Texas, as well as in the
newer [s]tates of the West generally, vast areas of land over
which, so long as the government owned them, cattle had been
permitted to roam at will for pasturage, it was not thought
proper, as the land was gradually taken up by individual pro-
prietors, to change the custom of the country in that particular,
and oblige cattle owners to incur the heavy expense of fencing
their land, or be held as trespassers by reason of their cattle
5. Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1515
(1984).
6. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S.
320, 326 (1890); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 76, at 53841 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 504 cmt. f
(1977).
7. Light, 220 U.S. at 535.
8. Marsha K. Ternus, Liability for the Escape of Animals, 30 DRAKE L. REV.
257, 257 (1980).
9. See KEETON, supra note 6, at 540, text accompanying notes 21-22.
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accidentally straying upon the land of others.°
The "open range" was mere custom-"an implied li-
cense"-unless embodied in state or territorial statutes." The
United States Supreme Court in 1911 described it thusly:
And so, without passing a statute, or taking any affirmative
action on the subject, the United States suffered its public
domain to be used for [open range]. There thus grew up a sort
of implied license that these lands, thus left open, might be
used so long as the Government did not cancel its tacit con-
sent. 12
B. Range Law Becomes Statute
Range custom evolved into statutes when state and territori-
al legislatures began to enact legislation. The "open range" stat-
utes in western states followed an almost identical pattern.
Montana's statute provides:
If any [livestock] break into any enclosure and the fence of the
enclosure is legal, as provided in [another code section], the
owner of the animals is liable for all damages to the owner or
occupant of the enclosure. This section may not be construed to
require a legal fence in order to maintain an action for injury
done by animals running at large contrary to law. 3
The First Territorial Legislature at Bannack enacted the Mon-
tana Open Range Statute in 1865. Today, its language remains
substantially unchanged. 4 A later companion section defines
"legal fence" as to height and spacing of posts and wires. 15
The statutes of most other western states are substantively
identical to Montana's, including Arizona, Arkansas, California,
the Dakotas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Texas and Wash-
ington."6 These statutes are notable as much for what they
10. Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894).
11. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
12. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993). This statute is referred to as the
"Montana Open Range Statute" throughout the text of this article.
14. AcTs, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA,
PASSED BY THE FIRST LEGIsLATIvE ASSEMBLY § 1, at 351-52 (Bannack 1864) (current
version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-101 (1993).
16. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461, 462 (Wash. 1911); Union Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 98 (1869); Thomas L. Palmer, Determining Liability of Ranchers
and Farmers for Injuries Caused by Fencing or Not Fencing Rangelands, 14 J. AGRIc.
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failed to do, as for what they did do. On their face the statutes
forbid collection of damages from the owner of wandering live-
stock unless one had a "legal fence" around one's land. Signifi-
cantly, these statutes did not declare a right to graze livestock
on another person's land. Neither did they discuss any other
remedies one might employ-such as injunctions, nuisance law,
or self-help. Likewise, the statutes did not treat other issues that
might arise-such as standards of care or highway problems.
Compared to the broad custom they replaced, the open range
statutes were facially quite narrow. This divergence left much
room for judicial interpretation.
C. A Changing West Provokes Changing Range Laws
Well before the turn of the century, fundamental societal
changes, primarily the increase in population and a change of
attitude towards pastureland and farmland, were already under-
mining the rationale for the open range. Other changes included:
the arrival of railroads capable of delivering fence posts to the
prairies, the invention of barbed wire in the 1870's, and the iron
windmill which could provide water to livestock nearly any-
where. 7
By 1889, the law of the open range was under attack. 8 In
1894, in Lazarus v. Phelps,9 the United States Supreme Court
held that common law liability principles continued to apply,
despite Texas' open range statute, where the defendant had
stocked the range with more animals than his portion of the land
would support. The Court construed the Texas Open Range Stat-
ute narrowly:
The object of the statute ... is manifest .... It could nev-
er have been intended, however, to authorize cattle owners
deliberately to take possession of such lands, and depasture
their cattle upon them without making compensation, particu-
larly if this were done against the will of the owner, or under
such circumstances as to show a deliberate intent to obtain the
benefit of another's pasturage. In other words, the trespass au-
thorized, or rather condoned, was an accidental trespass caused
by straying cattle .... The ordinary rule that a man is bound
to contemplate the natural and probable consequences of his
TAX'N & L. 25, 27 (1992); Grossfeld, supra note 5, at 1517 n.47.
17. Grossfeld, supra note 5, at 1517.
18. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890).
19. 152 U.S. 81 (1894).
488 [Vol. 56
4
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/5
MYTH OF THE OPEN RANGE
own act would apply in such a case.20
The Lazarus Court listed a variety of acts that would take a
stock owner's actions outside the protection of the Texas Open
Range Statute, including driving cattle upon another's lands,
overstocking the range, and enclosing another's lands along with
one's own.2
1
In essence, Lazarus established the principle that the com-
mon law remains intact, except to the extent it is modified by
open range statutes. The Court interpreted the Texas Open
Range Statutes as narrowly condoning only accidental trespass
by livestock.22 Other trespasses remained subject to common
law remedies. 23 By the first decade of this century, most courts
in open range states were either following the narrow-construc-
tion principle from Lazarus, or independently adopting it on
their own.24
Soon after Lazarus, the gratuitous open range came to an
end on most federal land. In 1897 forest reserve legislation com-
manded the responsible federal agency "to make such rules and
regulations... as will insure the objects of such reservation...
and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction."2' The reg-
ulations adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture prohibited all
but de minimis grazing on national forest reserves without pay-
ing for a grazing permit.
The federal regulations were challenged by Fred Light, a
rancher who owned 540 acres of Colorado land near the Holy
Cross Forest Reserve. He annually grazed 500 head of cattle on
the unfenced range consisting of his ranch, the land around it,
and the Reserve. The government sued to enjoin Light from
turning out his cattle to wander on the Reserve. Light responded
that Colorado's range statute gave him license to freely graze his
20. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 85-86.
22. Id at 85. The Texas open range statutes provided: "Every gardener, farmer,
or planter shall make a sufficient fence about his clear land under cultivation at
least five feet high, and make such fence sufficiently close to prevent hogs from pass-
ing through the same." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. § 2431 (1840). "If it shall appear that
the said fence is insufficient, then the owner of such [livestock] shall not be liable to
make satisfaction for such damages." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. § 2434 (1840).
23. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 84-86.
24. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461 (Wash. 1911); Jones v. Blythe, 93 P.
994 (Utah 1908); Bell v. Gonzales, 83 P. 639 (Colo. 1905); Martin v. Platte Valley
Sheep Co., 76 P. 571 (Wyo. 1904); Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863
(1900); Poindexter v. May, 34 S.E. 971 (Va. 1900); Union Pac. Ry. v. Rollins, 5 Kan.
98, 103-04 (1869). See also Robinson v. Kerr, 355 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1960).
25. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35. (appropriations bill).
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stock and that the forest regulations were void to the extent that
they exempted federal lands from the open range laws of Colora-
do. 2
6
In Light v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal government is not prohibited by the Colora-
do Open Range Statute from revoking the license to graze on
federal land, whether the land is owned in either a sovereign or
proprietary capacity.27 In that the case the Court stated, "Fence
laws do not authorize wanton and willful trespass, nor do they
afford immunity to those who, in disregard of property rights,
turn loose their cattle under circumstances showing that they
were intended to graze upon the lands of another."28 The Court
interpreted Mr. Light's refusal to get a grazing permit, his state-
ment that he would resist the removal of his cattle from the
reserve, and his intention to continue "turning out his cattle" as
beyond the protection of Colorado's open-range statute.29 While
the Court did not expressly require all users to acquire forest
grazing permits, the holding is broader than it asserts. The
Court upheld the grazing restrictions despite the absence of
evidence that Mr. Light committed any sort of overt act of the
kind proscribed in Lazarus.3 ° Most significantly, the Court im-
plicitly held, for the first time, that passive open-range grazing
could create liability on unfenced land.
Since Light, grazing prohibitions on unfenced federal land
have withstood every challenge. In Shannon v. United States,3
the same 1897 federal legislation was at issue in Montana's
Little Belt Mountains. The defendant argued that the Montana
Open Range Statute justified his grazing. The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the Property Clause of the United States Constitution
preempted any police power legislation of Montana that might
otherwise apply:
[Montana] could not give to the people of that state the right to
pasture cattle upon the public domain, or in any way to use the
same. Its own laws in regard to fencing and pasturing cattle at
large must be held to apply only to land subject to its own
dominion. No one within the state can claim any right in the
26. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 525, 526 (1911).
27. Id. at 537 (citing inter alia Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 81, and Monroe v. Can-
non, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P.2d'863 (1900)).
28. Light, 220 U.S. at 537.
29. Id. at 536-38.
30. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 85-86; see supra text accompanying note 21.
31. 160 F. 870 (9th Cir. 1908).
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public land by virtue of such a statute.32
Subsequently, the holdings of Light and Shannon were adopted
in United States v. Thompson,33 despite arguments that neither
case was applicable unless the defendant willfully committed
trespass upon federal land. The court in Thompson concluded
that while state police power statutes might permit cattle on
private lands to graze at large unless "fenced out," proprietary
federal property rights entitle the United States to reverse that
rule on federal land.34 Consistent subsequent cases appear to
settle the issue: The free "open range" in national forests and re-
serves is officially dead, state customs and statutes notwith-
standing.3"
Changes in grazing laws were also underway within open
range states. Most state legislatures enacted herd district stat-
utes that, by initiative of a local community, allowed the commu-
nity to fully or partially revert to the common law inside the
districts.36 Many other types of statutes also reimposed common
law fencing requirements in varying degrees and for various
purposes in what had formerly been the open range.37
In addition, by the beginning of this century, most state
courts were adopting the narrow-construction principle from
Lazarus which held that open range statutes are effective only to
modify, but not abolish common law liability." The common law
requires owners to "fence in" their livestock or else pay for re-
sulting trespasses. Thereupon, western courts became engaged in
the task of distinguishing protected activities under open range
statutes from those subject to common law liability. For example,
the Washington Supreme Court concluded that common law
rules controlled where adjoining landowners jointly enclosed
within an exterior boundary fence had not exercised their statu-
32. Shannon, 160 F. at 875.
33. 41 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
34. Id. at 15-16.
35. Bilderback v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 903 (D. Or. 1982); United States
v. Holman, 247 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Mo. 1965); United States v. Johnston, 38 F.
Supp. 4 (S.D. W. Va. 1941); United States v. Gurley, 279 F. 874 (N.D. Ga. 1922).
36. See, e.g., Easley v. Lee, 721 P.2d 215 (Idaho 1986); Lindsay v. Cobb, 627
P.2d 349 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
37. See, e.g., Vanderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1987); Fuchser v.
Jacobson, 290 N.W.2d 449 (Neb. 1980); Carver v. Ford, 591 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1979);
Wenndt v. Latare, 200 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1972); Vangilder v. Faulk, 426 S.W.2d 821
(Ark. 1968); Poindexter v. May, 34 S.E. 971 (Va. 1900); Haigh v. Bell, 23 S.E. 666
(W. Va. 1895).
38. See supra note 24.
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tory right to erect a partition fence between them. 9 The court
awarded the plaintiff damages caused by defendant's trespassing
livestock.4'
For the last half-century, range issues in state courts have
increasingly shifted from farmer/rancher litigation to motor-
ist/rancher cases. These new-generation range cases typically
involve claims for death or injury from vehicle accidents caused
by livestock wandering onto highways.
Historically, the common law had provided a "public ways"
exception to the fencing-in requirement for livestock. Unless the
animals were known to possess "an unruly disposition," they
were free to roam public roads at will.4 1 Thus, in highway cases
in western states these two different theories were effectively
argued to justify judgments for defendant stockmen, both com-
mon law and open range law.42
As vehicle congestion increased, however, many state courts
began to modify the common law, stating essentially, "There is
no reason for exempting cattle owners from the same duty appli-
cable to other people to use 'ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of [their] property."'43 Thus, in many states the common
law immunity was changed to reflect an ordinary negligence
standard for stock owners-a trend increasingly followed
throughout the United States." Even most of the open range
states now appear to require "ordinary due care" by owners of
livestock with regard to the animals' presence on public high-
ways.' In doing so, some courts expressly considered and re-
jected the applicability of their states' open range laws in vehi-
cle-livestock collisions." A few dissenting courts remain, but the
39. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461, 462 (Wash. 1911).
40. Id.; see supra note 24.
41. See, e.g., Pelham v. Spears, 132 So. 886 (Ala. 1931).
42. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967).
43. Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett, 120 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1941) (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714).
44. George v. Perkins, 221 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1969); Rice v. Turner, 62 S.E.2d
24 (Va. 1950); Bender v. Welsh, 25 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1942); Drew v. Gross, 147 N.E.
757 (Ohio 1925); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Owner of Animal
for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person Riding Therein Resulting From
Collision with Domestic Animal at Large in Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R. 4th 431,
443-47 (1984).
45. Galeppi Bros., 120 F.2d at 209 (applying California law); Carrow Co. v.
Lusby, 804 P.2d 747 (Ariz. 1990); Grubb v. Wolfe, 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965);
Eixenberger v. Belle Fourche Livestock Exch., 58 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1953); Shepard v.
Smith, 263 P.2d 985 (Idaho 1953); Summers v. Parker, 259 P.2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953); Jackson v. Hardy, 160 P.2d 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
46. Carrow, 804 P.2d at 750-54; Grubb, 408 P.2d at 758-60; Galeppi Bros., 120
492 [Vol. 56
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modern view that stock owners will be held to ordinary negli-
gence duties seems to be most widely accepted.47
Although open range statutes remain on the books in many
states, the circumstances justifying them have largely vanished
in the dust of history. Erecting fences and watering stock in
remote places is no longer impossible, and little chance remains
of "wasting" uneaten grass. More significantly, most of the West
is now in private or proprietary ownership with commensurate
competing land uses. In light of these changes, legislative and
judicial inroads have cut deeply into the open range. However,
Montana's situation appears to be unique.
III. MONTANA RANGE LAW
A. Before the Turn of the Century
The early Montana Supreme Court briefly gave great defer-
ence to the concept of the open range.' In 1874, the court in
Smith v. Williams interpreted the territorial Open Range Stat-
ute49 to require complete enclosure as a prerequisite to receiv-
ing damages from trespassing stock."0 The court insisted that a
"legal fence" at the point of breach was insufficient." Again, in
1889, the court affirmed a jury instruction under the Open
Range Statute that if a defendant drove livestock onto plaintiffs
unfenced land for pasture, but did not do so with malice, then
the defendant must prevail in a damages action.2
By the close of the century, Montana's range was changing
along with the rest of the country's. The 1895 legislature enacted
various regulations and closures of the open range. These enact-
ments categorically closed the range to "swine,"" and any "stud
horse, ridgeling, or unaltered male mule or jackass over [eigh-
teen] months. . . ."' The open range was closed to rams and
F.2d at 210; Jackson, 160 P.2d. at 165.
47. Compare Galeppi Bros., 120 F.2d at 209; Carrow Co., 804 P.2d 747; Grubb,
408 P.2d 756; Eixenberger, 58 N.W.2d 235; Shepard, 263 P.2d 985; Summers, 259
P.2d 59; Jackson, 160 P.2d 161 with George, 221 So. 2d 717; Rice, 62 S.E.2d 24;
Bender, 25 A.2d 182; Drew, 147 N.E. 757.
48. See Smith v. Williams, 2 Mont. 195 (1874).
49. AcTS, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA,
PASSED BY THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY § 1, at 351 (Bannack 1864) (current
version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
50. Smith, 2 Mont. at 201.
51. Id.
52. Fant v. Lyman, 9 Mont. 61, 22 P. 120 (1889).
53. IV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XIV., § 1165 (1895).
54. LV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XIV., § 1163 (1895).
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"he goat[s]" from August 1 to December 1." Over the years,
those types of restrictions multiplied. The following are all now
forbidden to run at large in Montana: swine, sheep, llamas, al-
pacas, bison, goats,56 "male equine animals,"57 mixed-breed
bulls, and bulls of any kind between December 1 and June 1.58
Over time the legislature has imposed many regulations on
what was once the open range.59 Herd district laws were enact-
ed in 1917.6o Owners or possessors of fifty-five percent of the
land, not less than twelve square miles in size, must petition to
create a district." Allowing animals to run at large in a herd
district is a misdemeanor.62
B. Open Range Cases From 1900 to 1960
Apace with a changing Montana, in 1900, the Montana Su-
preme Court criticized its 1889 Fant decision and expressly
adopted the Lazarus principle, becoming one of the first state
courts to do so.63 Monroe v. Cannon applied common law strict
liability principles to permit a landowner to seek damages from a
sheepman who had herded his stock onto the plaintiffs land,
saying:
[A]ppellant contends that the provisions of [the Montana Open
Range Statute]... negative the right to sue for damages,
where the premises are not inclosed by a legal fence .... If
appellant is correct, no man whose field, or pasture, or garden
is not inclosed by a legal fence, is entitled to any protection
under the law from the trespasses of any man who may desire
to drive or herd his cattle or sheep upon it .... The mistake
appellant makes is in concluding that the [Montana Open
Range Statute].. . does not modify, but abrogates the rights ex-
isting under the common law."
In adopting the Lazarus principle, the Montana Supreme Court
55. IV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XrV., § 1164 (1895).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-201 (1993).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-204 (1993).
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-210 (1993).
59. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-201 to -220 (1993); MONT. CODE.
ANN. §§ 76-16-101 to -415 (1993); see also 1939 Mont. Laws 554, § 26.
60. 1917 Mont. Laws 102 (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-309 to -
328 (1993)).
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-301 (1993).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-306 (1993).
63. Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 324-26, 61 P. 863, 865-66 (1900).
64. Id. at 321-22, 61 P. at 864-65 (emphasis added).
494 [Vol. 56
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applied an elementary rule of statutory construction-common
law controls except when modified by statute.65 The court held
that deliberate herding of stock onto unfenced private lands was
not within the scope of the Open Range Statute, and was not,
therefore, insulated from common law strict liability.
Two years later, in Beinhorn v. Griswold,6 the Montana
Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of the Lazarus prin-
ciple in light of the Open Range Statute. Beinhorn's cattle were
grazing public range when they wandered onto Griswold's un-
fenced mining claim, drank from open containers of cyanide
solution and, regrettably, died. At issue was the standard of care
to be imposed on Griswold-was he entitled to treat the cattle as
trespassers, licensees or invitees? Using the Lazarus principle,
the court concluded that common law tort rules were not dis-
placed by the Open Range Statute. Thus, the cattle were treated
as trespassers:
The owner is entitled to the exclusive possession of his
land, whether fenced or not; and it is beyond the power of the
legislature to prescribe, or of custom to create, a right in anoth-
er to occupy the land or enjoy its fruits. Either written law or
custom may withhold from the owner who does not fence his
land a remedy for loss suffered by reason of casual trespasses
by cattle which stray upon it, and may give a remedy for such
trespasses to those only who inclose their land .... This is
undoubtedly a legitimate exercise of the police power. It falls
far short, however, of conferring a legal right to dispossess the
nonfencing owner .... The owners of domestic animals hold no
servitude upon or interest, temporary or permanent, in, the open
land of another, merely because it is open. 7
Starting with Monroe and Beinhorn, for the first sixty years
of this century, the Montana Supreme Court conscientiously
applied the Lazarus principle to open range issues. The court
decided fifteen open range cases, using the common law rather
than the Open Range Statute in ten of them." In only two cas-
65. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-108-109, 1-2-103 (1993); O'Fallon v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 260 Mont. 233, 244, 859 P.2d 1008, 1015 (1993); State ex rel. La Point v. Dis-
trict Court, 69 Mont. 29, 33, 220 P. 88, 89 (1923); Finlen v. Heinze, 28 Mont. 548,
563-64, 73 P. 123, 126 (1903).
66. 27 Mont. 79, 69 P. 557 (1902).
67. Id. at 89, 69 P. at 558 (emphasis added).
68. Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d 1022 (1959); Hill v.
Chappel Bros. Inc., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932); Herness v. McCann, 90 Mont.
95, 300 P. 257 (1931); Long v. Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 P. 667 (1923); Dorman v.
Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 208 P. 908 (1922); Chilcott v. Rea, 52 Mont. 134, 155 P. 1114
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es did the court apply the Open Range Statute and insulate
stock owners from liability.69 Generally, the court's decisions
carefully distinguished conduct prohibited under common law
grazing rules from actions that were permitted by the Open
Range Statute. In doing so, like other states' courts, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court increasingly tended to restrict the types of
conduct permitted on the open range.
In 1912, the court expanded on Monroe by holding that one
who deliberately herds stock on unfenced range does so "at his
peril" with regard to the location of boundaries between his
leased range and his neighbor's land.7 ° In Herrin v. Sieben, the
plaintiff owned land in checkerboard with the defendant's feder-
ally leased range. The evidence supporting the jury verdict
showed that the defendant had "depastured substantially the
whole area of plaintiffs lands, and that during this time he real-
ized no benefit from them."71
In 1916, the common law liability imposed upon herders of
stock was expanded a step further.72 In Chilcott v. Rea, the de-
fendants were herding sheep along a public road when nightfall
forced them to bed down the sheep without food or water.73
During the night the sheep broke through a fence and consumed
$7,570 worth of the plaintiffs orchard. The defendants argued
that "no right to recover for depredations of this sort can be
based upon ordinary negligence, but the 'complaint must either
show that the lands were inclosed with a legal fence, or that the
trespass was the result of the willful, intentional act of the de-
fendants.' 74 The supreme court disagreed, stating:
[W]here negligence is charged to the owner of such animals,
and where it is claimed by him that the nonexistence of a legal
fence was a factor in the control by him of such animals, the
absence of a fence or its nonlegal character might be material
(1916); Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323 (1912); Musselshell Cattle Co. v.
Woolfolk, 34 Mont. 126, 85 P. 874 (1906); Beinhorn, 27 Mont at 89, 69 P. at 558;
Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863 (1900).
69. Dunbar v. Emigh, 117 Mont. 287, 158 P.2d 311 (1945); Schreiner v. Deep
Creek Stock Ass'n, 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923). Three cases were ultimately de-
cided on collateral issues: Thompson v. Tobacco Root Coop., 121 Mont. 445, 193 P.2d
811 (1948); Rea Bros. Sheep Co. v. Rudi, 46 Mont. 149, 127 P. 85 (1912); Clemmons
v. Gillette, 33 Mont. 321, 83 P. 879 (1905).
70. Herrin, 46 Mont. at 233, 127 P. at 327.
71. Id. at 229, 127 P. at 326.
72. Chilcott, 52 Mont. at 138, 155 P. at 1115.
73. Id. at 139, 155 P. at 1115.
74. Id. 138, 155 P. at 1115.
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upon the question of his negligence; but where animals are held
in herd... and they invade such property through either the
willful act or the negligence of their owner... such invasion is
an actionable trespass, and the want of a legal fence is not
material."
Monroe, Herrin, and Chilcott established the principle that
herding stock on unfenced land would give rise to common law
damages if the injury resulted from a willful act, negligence, or
an error in ascertaining ownership boundaries. Thereafter, the
Montana Supreme Court began to impose common law liability
on various other open range activities, even though no herding
was involved.
In 1922, the court held that the Open Range Statute was
intended only to avoid liability for stock running on the public
range, but not to apply in disputes between adjoining owners
whose lands are wholly enclosed from the public range.76 In
Dorman v. Erie, Mr. Erie's half-mile long fence was located thir-
ty feet inside of the boundary line with his neighbor. Erie fre-
quently opened the gate in this fence, thereby allowing his cattle
to graze on the thirty-foot strip as well as his neighbor's adjoin-
ing pasture. The supreme court imposed liability on Eire, noting
that Monroe v. Cannon "declared that the purpose of [the Open
Range Statute] was to condone trespasses committed by animals
lawfully running at large, and that the common-law rule is left
otherwise unchanged."77
Then, in 1932, the court in Hill v. Chappel Bros. Inc., ex-
pressly followed Lazarus and prohibited overstocking of the
range.78 In that case, the defendants and the plaintiffs had both
leased vast tracts of open range on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation. Defendants, however, ran several thousand more
horses on the range than their share would support. The court
concluded: "[F]ence laws do not furnish immunity to one who, in
disregard of property rights, turns loose his cattle under circum-
stances showing that they were intended to graze upon the land
of another."79
Likewise, in 1959, in Thompson v. Mattuschek, the court
75. Id. at 138-39, 155 P. at 1115 (emphasis added).
76. Dorman v. Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 583-84, 208 P. 908, 909 (1922) (citing cases
from the following open range states: Washington, Utah, Indiana and California).
77. Id. at 585, 208 P. at 909.
78. 93 Mont. 92, 101, 18 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1932).
79. Hill, 93 Mont. at 101, 18 P.2d at 1109 (citing Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 527 (1910)).
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held that tearing down the partition fence between neighbors
was beyond the protection of the Open Range Statute where, as
a result, defendant's cattle grazed on plaintiffs land."0
Mattuschek's and Thompson's land was wholly enclosed by an
external perimeter fence."'
Only two of the fifteen open range cases decided by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court between 1900 and 1960 invoked the immu-
nities of the Open Range Statute. 2 In the first case, decided in
1923, the court explained that merely using line-riders for the
general purpose of keeping cattle under control did not automati-
cally impose common law liability for straying cattle." The
court ruled that to be held liable, the stockowner must act negli-
80. 134 Mont. 500, 509, 333 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1959).
81. By statute in Montana, fences are of two basic kinds: personal and parti-
tion. Personal fences are built entirely on one persons property and at one's personal
expense. Partition fences are built on, or as directly adjoining property boundaries as
feasible (bluffs, perhaps interfering). See Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 400
P.2d 403 (1965). The expense of building and maintaining partition fences will, under
certain circumstances, be shared. Regarding partition fences, any agreement between
the parties controls. The statutes only apply if there is no agreement. See Thompson,
134 Mont. at 508, 333 P.2d at 1026.
Absent an agreement, statutes provide that the construction and maintenance
of partition fences between neighbors, both of whom enclose their lands, shall be
shared equally. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-206 (1993). Likewise, where externally
fenced lands are shared in common between adjoining landowners, and one owner
wishes to end the common range, he can on six months notice, compel the adjoining
owner to build half the fence or share half the cost of construction. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-16-208 (1993).
Where the perimeter of the common pasture is not fenced, if one party fences
his land, he may erect a partition fence between him and his neighbor. But the
neighbor will not be required to pay for half, unless and until the neighbor chooses
to fence his perimeter and thereby makes use of the partition fence previously erect-
ed. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-207 (1993); see, e.g., Sparks v. Halseth, 154 Mont. 395,
465 P.2d 100 (1970).
The reverse is also true. Where a partition fence divides properties, both of
which are fenced on the perimeter, one party, on six months notice, may decide to
remove his half of the partition fence, unless his neighbor buys him out. The buyout
means paying half the value of the fence. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-210 (1993). This
only works where the initiating neighbor also removes or destroys a substantial part
of his perimeter fence. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-207 (1993).
Where a legitimate partition fence exists, and the parties are jointly responsi-
ble for it, a neglect to repair by any party empowers his neighbor to repair it as his
expense on 5 days notice or to replace it on 60 days notice. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
16-209 (1993). Each landowner is responsible for maintaining the "right" half of the
fence as he views it from his property. Where one owner's land is completely en-
closed by the others, then they are each to maintain half of the fence to the right of
the northeasterly corner as each views it. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-205 (1993).
82. Dunbar v. Emigh, 117 Mont. 287, 158 P.2d 311 (1945); Schreiner v. Deep
Creek Stock Ass'n, 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923).
83. Schreiner, 68 Mont. at 108-12, 217 P. at 664-66.
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gently or willfully in causing the animals' presence on the
plaintiff's land."
Then, in 1945, the court held that when there was no evi-
dence of willfulness or negligence, "the mere knowledge or expec-
tation by one who turns cattle loose in a place where he has a
right to release them that they may or probably will wander
upon the lands of another ... is not alone sufficient to consti-
tute willful trespass."85 The court interpreted the Open Range
Statute to insulate such a defendant from injunctive relief as
well as damages.86  Notably, a substantial part of the
defendant's land was wholly surrounded by the plaintiffs, and
the court pointed out that the injunction remained valid to the
extent that "there were willful acts or negligence on [defendant's]
part in causing the livestock to enter plaintiffs lands."87 Both
Schreiner v. Deep Creek Stock Ass'n and Dunbar v. Emigh were
careful to discuss and distinguish the application of the Lazarus
principle.'
For sixty years, therefore, the Montana Supreme Court was
largely consistent in its treatment of open range issues. Acciden-
tal trespass by livestock at large was insulated by the Open
Range Statute from liability for damages. However, numerous
other trespasses at common law were not insulated-herding of
stock willfully, negligently, or in error as to land boundaries. In
addition, overstocking, willful fence destruction and any turning
loose of one's livestock "under circumstances showing that they
were intended to graze upon the land of another" 9 were all sub-
ject to common law damages.
C. The Modern Court Adopts the Myth
The year 1964 marked a turning point for Montana range
law. Thereafter, the Montana Supreme Court departed altogeth-
er from its careful scholarship that for six decades had main-
tained a balance between open range and common law princi-
ples. The change might be attributed to new members on the
court. Also, by then issues of range law occupied less space on
84. Id.
85. Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 292, 158 P.2d at 313.
86. Id. at 294, 158 P.2d at 314.
87. Id. at 293, 158 P.2d at 314.
88. Id. at 291-94, 158 P.2d at 313-14; Schreiner, 68 Mont. at 109-12, 217 P. at
664-66.
89. Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 508, 333 P.2d 1022, 1026-27
(1959) (quoting Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 291, 158 P.2d at 313).
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the jurisprudential horizon which possibly produced less incen-
tive for careful scholarship. For whatever reason, beginning in
1964, the Montana Supreme Court ceased even to consider the
Lazarus principle in any of its decisions and embarked on what
can fairly be described as a wholesale embrace of the western
myth of the open range. 0
Another change happened in the 1960's. As in other courts
in the nation,91 most Montana open range cases shifted to live-
stock accidents on highways92 or other livestock tort situa-
tions.9" Only one case considered a fairly traditional open range
issue. 4
In the first case of this era, decided in 1964, an electrical
substation was fenced five feet inside the property boundary.
The power company sprayed a poisonous chemical along the base
of the fence solely on its own land. The plaintiff's cattle, which
were fenced into the adjoining field but not separated from the
substation fence, died after consuming the poisoned grass. The
supreme court affirmed a jury verdict on the basis of a duty to
warn the cattle's owner. The court's opinion discussed neither
the Lazarus principle nor common law tort principles (which ar-
guably would have applied under the Lazarus principle). Instead,
with a lengthy factual discussion, the court stated that defen-
dant should be held to the standard of care of an "ordinary pru-
dent person," and distinguished Beinhorn v. Griswold "on its
facts."96 The Hopkins decision could probably be justified under
common law principles as holding that the plaintiffs cattle bene-
fitted from an implied license to graze up to the substation fence,
90. No Montana Supreme Court case after 1945 has cited either Lazarus or
Monroe. Compare infra notes 92-93 with Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 292, 158 P.2d at 313.
However, in 1959, the court discussed and applied the Lazarus principle, without
citing it. Thompson, 134 Mont. at 508-09, 333 P.2d at 1026-27.
91. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Williams v. Selstad,
235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d
1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013 (1982); Sanders v.
Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972); Jenkins v. Valley
Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968); Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149
Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967).
93. State ex rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987) (address-
ing livestock as a public nuisance); Hopkins v. Ravalli County Elec. Coop., 144 Mont.
161, 395 P.2d 106 (1964) (addressing premises liability).
94. Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403, 406 (1965).
Although the case principally involved boundary definitions in a deed, the Montana
Supreme Court sua sponte added a discussion on open range fencing.
95. Hopkins, 144 Mont. at 163, 395 P.2d at 109.
96. Id. at 165, 395 P.2d at 108.
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and therefore the plaintiff was owed the duties due to a licensee.
The decision was so vague it is difficult to discern the court's
reasoning.
In 1967, the court considered its first automobile/livestock
collision case. The wife of the plaintiff was killed in an auto colli-
sion with a black horse that wandered onto the highway in open
range at night.97 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had a
tort duty of ordinary "due care" arising from both common law
and statute.98 A $64,000 jury verdict for the husband was re-
versed in an opinion that quoted the Smith, Beinhorn, Schreiner,
Thompson, and Montgomery cases for the general proposition
"that Montana remains an open range state" and "the owner of
livestock has no duty to prevent the livestock from wander-
ing."" The Montana Supreme Court, therefore, held that the
defendant had "no duty" in tort or otherwise to keep his horse off
the highway.1" The court did not further analyze open range
issues. It made no comment on the holding of Beinhorn which
applied the Lazarus principle."' Nor did the court note that
Schreiner had been partly repudiated by Herness, precisely on
the question of whether "negligence" removed a stock owner from
the protection of the Open Range Statute.10 2 Without mention
or discussion, the court ignored the authorities cited by the
plaintiff from the growing number of states that impose ordinary
negligence duties on the owners of stock involved in highway
crashes."
Thereafter, in six subsequent highway cases the Montana
Supreme Court reflexively cited and applied the Bartsch holding
without further analysis of open range issues."' The court's
opinions propounded wide generalities such as, "An open range
designation implies that an owner is not liable for his wandering
97. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 407, 427 P.2d 302, 303 (1967);
Respondent's Brief at 1-2, 18-37, Bartsch (No. 11252).
98. Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 407, 427 P.2d at 303.
99. Id. at 407-409, 427 P.2d at 304-305.
100. Id. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305.
101. Beinhorn v. Griswold, 27 Mont. 79, 89-90, 69 P. 557, 558-59 (1902).
102. Herness v. McCann, 90 Mont. 95, 102, 300 P. 257, 259 (1931).
103. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Respondent's Brief at 18-
37, Bartsch (No. 11252).
104. Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 458-60, 853 P.2d 1214, 1217-19 (1993); Wil-
liams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 139, 766 P.2d 247, 248 (1988); Siegfried v. Atchison,
219 Mont. 14, 16, 709 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111,
119, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1982); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont.
73, 78, 500 P.2d 397, 400 (1972); Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont.
463, 465, 443 P.2d 753, 754-55 (1968).
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livestock." °5 Most recently the court hailed, "[O]ur consistent
refusal to impose a duty on ... livestock owners relative to fenc-
Y)106ing livestock off roadways ....
In two highway cases, the court did rule favorably for plain-
tiffs injured by collisions with livestock. But in neither case did
the court analyze the Lazarus principle nor otherwise integrate
its decisions with earlier ones. In 1972, in Sanders v. Mount
Haggin Livestock, the court concluded: "No one will dispute that
Montana is an open range state. This Court has many times so
ruled. But, as with every rule of law, definite exceptions do exist.
The exception to the open range rule exists when the animals in
question are in charge of herders." °7 Unfortunately, the court
in Sanders apparently failed to comprehend either the source of
the exception it applied,' 8 or its scope.0 9 Nor did the court
correctly analyze the common law duties that consequently re-
sult." At common law, even as modified by cases in majority
courts, one is entitled to herd livestock on public roadways, but
in doing so the herdsman must exercise due care."'
In 1982, the court again reflexively followed Bartsch, and
pronounced Montana to be an open range state. However, the
court reversed summary judgment for the defendant because a
1974 statutory amendment, that forbade the negligent release of
livestock onto primary highways, gave rise to an issue of
fact."2 That statute was enacted in 1951 to forbid "willful" re-
lease of stock on fenced highways,"3 then amended to impose a
negligence standard on the stock owner."4 Even today, howev-
105. Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 119, 642 P.2d at 1018.
106. Yager, 258 Mont. at 460, 853 P.2d at 1219.
107. 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400.
108. Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 326, 61 P. 863 (1900) following Lazarus v.
Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1893); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
109. Sanders, 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400. Sanders suggests that any ani-
mals in the charge of herders are within the exception, even though Schreiner v.
Deep Creek Stock Ass'n., 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923), and Herness v. McCann,
90 Mont. 95, 300 P. 257 (1931), hold otherwise, depending on circumstances.
110. Sanders, 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400.
111. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
112. Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 119-21, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018-19 (1982)
(citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-7-201 to -202 (1993)).
113. 1951 Mont. Laws 157-58 (codified as amended at REV. CODE MONT. § 32-
1018 (1947) (superseded)) (crime of using United States highways for pasturage or
running of livestock).
114. 1974 Mont. Laws 872 (codified as amended at REV. CODE MONT. § 32-21-
176 -177 (1974) (superseded) (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-201 (1993))
(revision of laws relating to the department of highways).
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er, the statute is subject to broad exclusions,"' and the legisla-
ture, perhaps well-representing its ranching constituency, has
put most of the burden for fencing highways onto the state."'
These legislative changes, even though significant, do not ad-
dress a myriad of situations; such as liability for escaping stock,
city and county road issues, and ordinary nuisance.
In 1987, the Montana Supreme Court considered one of
these issues in a case brought by the Mineral County Attorney
for statutory public nuisance against stock owners whose ani-
mals were roaming at will on public roads and private land."'
The court quashed an injunction against the stock owners. Once
again, the court reflexively followed Bartsch and refused to apply
the public nuisance statute in the face of the open range cus-
tom." The court made no mention of Lazarus, Monroe, or the
Open Range Statute itself."9
A more scholarly opinion would have affirmed the district
court. For example, the supreme court could easily have recon-
ciled the two seemingly inconsistent statutes since the Open
Range Statute forecloses only "damages." The Open Range Stat-
ute says nothing about preempting other statutory remedies
such as nuisance. Alternatively, the court could have applied the
Lazarus principle to affirm the injunction as a legitimate exer-
cise of public nuisance law-a common law set of principles that
survive the Open Range Statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The open range remains a charming myth of the old West.
But Montana has changed since the enactment of the Open
Range Statute 130 years ago. The Montana Supreme Court so
declared in Ambrogini in 1982, saying, "The open range tradition
has become increasingly eroded over the years as a greater num-
ber of motorists have appeared on Montana's roads and
highways."2 ' Similarly, in a 1967 plaintive concurrence, Jus-
tice John C. Harrison cried out for changes to the open range
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-202 (1993).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-7-101 to -103 (1993) (requiring the Department of
Transportation to erect fences in most new or reconstructed areas of the state high-
way system).
117. State ex reL. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 245, 738 P.2d 497, 499
(1987).
118. Il
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993).
120. Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 119, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1982).
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law of Montana. 2' Still, the modern supreme court has all but
abdicated power on open range questions by reflexively repeating
the myth. In so doing, the court abandons the issue to the
legislature's periodic tinkering.
Today, however, public policy needs reason rather than ro-
mance. Motorists are maimed or die in collisions with livestock
whose owners are not required to fence them off highways.'
Roaming livestock belonging to a single owner can create a pub-
lic nuisance for an entire community. 12 These situations need
not be condoned by law. The Montana Supreme Court should
return to its historically narrow construction of open range law
by re-embracing its own sixty years of authority from 1900 to
1960. The court should follow the lead of other western state
courts that impose a duty of ordinary care on stockowners.
Unfortunately, since 1964, the Montana Supreme Court's
unequivocal embrace of the open range concept makes it doubtful
the court will be receptive to a revival of the Lazarus principle
from Monroe v. Cannon. Doing so would require the court to
limit, criticize, or outright overrule many recent decisions.'
Nonetheless, the court has corrected its errors in the past;'
the court should do so again.
121. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 410-11, 427 P.2d 302, 305 (1967)
(Harrison, J., concurring).
122. See, e.g., Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Bartsch,
149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302.
123. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987).
124. Williams v. Selstad 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); State ex rel. Mar-
tin, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497; Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006
(1985); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972);
Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968); Bartsch,
149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302.
125. With regard to determining titles in navigable rivers, for purposes of distin-
guishing the doctrines of avulsion from accretion and reliction, the Montana Supreme
Court redefined the term avulsion consistently with other authorities and repudiated
its earlier holding. Montana Dep't of State Lands v. Armstrong, 251 Mont. 235, 238,
824 P.2d 255, 257-58 (1992) (criticizing McCafferty v. Young, 144 Mont. 385, 397
P.2d 96 (1964)).
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